Faced with both identity theft and the theft of means of authentication, users of digital services are starting to look rather suspiciously at online systems. To increase access security it is necessary to introduce some new factor of implicit authentication such as user behavior analysis. A behavior is made up of a series of observable actions and taken as a whole, the most frequent of these actions amount to habit. The challenge is to detect identity theft as quickly as possible and, reciprocally, to validate a legitimate identity for as long as possible. To take up this challenge, we introduce in this paper a closed setbased learning classifier. This classifier is inspired by classification in concept lattices from positive and negative examples and several works on emerging patterns. We also rely on the tf-idf parameter used in the context of information retrieval. We propose three heuristics named H c tf −idf , H c sup and H c supMin to select closed patterns for each class to be described. To compute performance of our models we have followed an experimental protocol described in a previous study which had the same purpose. Then, we compared the results from our own dataset of web navigation connection logs of 3,000 users over a six-month period with the heuristic H sup introduced in this study. Moreover, to strengthen our analysis, we have designed and set up one model based on the naive Bayes classifier to be used as a reference statistical tool.
Faced with both identity theft and the theft of means of authentication, users of digital services are starting to look rather suspiciously at online systems. To increase access security it is necessary to introduce some new factor of implicit authentication such as user behavior analysis. A behavior is made up of a series of observable actions and taken as a whole, the most frequent of these actions amount to habit. The challenge is to detect identity theft as quickly as possible and, reciprocally, to validate a legitimate identity for as long as possible. To take up this challenge, we introduce in this paper a closed setbased learning classifier. This classifier is inspired by classification in concept lattices from positive and negative examples and several works on emerging patterns. We also rely on the tf-idf parameter used in the context of information retrieval. We propose three heuristics named H
Introduction
In order to achieve productivity gains, companies encourage their customers to access their services via the Internet. It is accepted that on-line services are more immediate and user-friendly than accessing these services via a brick and mortar agency, which involves going there and, more often than not, waiting around (cf. [8] ). Nevertheless, access to on-line services does pose security problems. Certain services provide access to sensitive data such as banking data, for which it is absolutely essential to authenticate the users concerned. However, identity theft is becoming more and more common (cf. [17] ). We can distinguish two paradigms for increasing access security. The first one consists of making access protocols stronger by relying, for example, on external devices for transmitting access codes that are supplementary to the login/password pair. Nevertheless, these processes are detrimental to the user-friendliness and usability of the services. The number of
Related works
Classification with closed sets is a subject that has been developed, in particular in concept lattices. Specifically, from the work of V.K. Finn in [4] describing a plausible reasoning in JSM type systems, the authors of [13, 14] design and formalize a classifier in concept lattices from positive and negative examples. But, by using this binary classifier to our context with n classes (where n stands for the number of users of a given system) we could classify as non-identifiable most of the anonymous behaviors.
In 2007, the authors of [19] defined emerging patterns as patterns appearing frequently on the objects in a single class, but being harder to find in objects belonging to other classes (cf. [6, 18] for surveys on emerging patterns). However, a difficulty remains in selecting the most efficient emerging patterns among the large number of patterns. Intuitively, the authors of [19] used the support measure to define and extract emerging patterns.
In our context of security, implicit authentication systems were studied quickly for mobile phones. In [21] , the authors studied behavior based on variables specific to smart phones such as calls, SMS's, browsing between applications, location, and the time of day. Experiments were conducted based on the data for 50 users over a period of 12 days. The data were gathered using an application installed by users who were volunteers. The user profiles were built up from how frequently positive or negative events occurred and the location. Within this context, a positive event is an event consistent with the information gathered upstream. By way of an example, calling a number which is in the phone's directory is a positive event.
The results of this study show that based on ten or so actions, you can detect fraudulent use of a smartphone with an accuracy of 95%. In a quite different context, the authors of [25] relied on a Bayesian classification in order to associate a behavior class with each video streaming user. The data set is simulated and consists of 1,000 users over 100 days. The variables taken into account are the quality of the flow, the type of program, the duration of the session, the type of user, and the popularity of the video. The results are not accurate enough for our needs, because the proposed model has an accuracy rate of 50%.
The particular context of implicit authentication for web browsing was studied in [1, 7, 12, 26] . In [26] , the author adopted the domain name, the number of pages viewed, the session start time and its duration as characteristic variables. The data set, which was gathered by a service provider, consisted of 300 first connections by 2,798 users over a period of 12 months. The user profiles consisted of patterns of size 1. The author compares several pattern selection approaches such as the support and the relative support approaches. The study shows that for small, anonymous behavioral patterns (involving up to twenty or so sites visited), the most effective models are still traditional classification models such as decision trees. On the other hand, whenever anonymous behavior exceeds 70 or so sites, the support and relative support-based classification models are more accurate. The study conducted in [1] states that the size of the dataset remains a determining parameter. Their study, conducted on 10 users over a one-month period, did not enable them to build a significant model for distinguishing users. The authors also concluded that no variable taken individually enables a user to be authenticated. Drawing inspiration from a study conducted in [26] , the authors of [10] studied several techniques for analyzing a user who holds a dynamic IP address, based on behavioral models. The compared methods are seeking motives, the nearest neighbors technique, and the multinomial Bayesian classifier. The dataset consisted of DNS requests from 3,600 users over a two-month period. In this study, only the most significant variables and the most popular host names were considered. The accuracy rate for the models proposed was satisfactory.
From our point of view, the study carried out in [26] is the most detailed and accurate. For this reason, we faithfully reproduce here his experimental protocol on our own dataset and we compare performance of our classification heuristics to his specific models.
Formal framework
We call a session a set of visited websites by a given user u i with i in [1, n] and n the number of users. The size of sessions is fixed. 1 The learning database of each user u i takes the form of a list of sessions denoted S u i and is built from log data. 2 More precisely, thanks to a timestamp associated to each visited web site by a given user, we are able to build its set of sessions by taking into account the natural order of the visits. But, after this last step, each session is then considered as a non ordered set of websites. Thus, inside a session the natural order is not taken into account. We call S = ⋃ i S u i the whole list of sessions of the database. We call X u i the set of websites visited at least once by user u i and we call X = ⋃ i X u i the whole set of websites. Fig. 1 shows our running example.
Definition 1 (k-pattern). Let X be a set of websites and S be a list of sessions on X . A subset P of X of size k is called a k-pattern.
Let S be a set, we note |S| the size of S.
Definition 2 (Supports and Relative Support)
. Let S be a list of sessions and P a pattern. We define the overall support of a pattern P as the percentage of sessions in S containing P:
By extension the support of a pattern P in the list of sessions S u i of a user u i is : For a given user u i , the relative strength of a pattern is :
The within-user support measures the strength of a pattern in behavioral description of a given user. The relative support mitigates the within-user support measure by considering the overall support of the pattern.
Example 1 (From Our Running Example). Let P 1 = {abe} and P 2 = {af } be two patterns. We have:
The tf-idf is a numerical statistic that is intended to reflect how relevant a word is to a document in a corpus. The tf-idf value increases proportionally to the number of times a word appears in the document, but is offset by the frequency of the word in the whole corpus [20] . In our context, a word becomes a pattern, a document becomes a set of sessions S u i of a given user and the corpus becomes the set S of all sessions.
Definition 3 (tf-idf). Let P be a pattern, let U be a set of users and U p ⊆ U such that ∀u i ∈ U p , support Su i (P) ̸ = 0. Let S u i be the list of sessions of a user u i and S a set of sessions. The normalized term frequency denoted tf (P) is equal to the within-user support support Su i (P) and the inverse document frequency denoted idf (P) is equal to log (|U|/|U P |). 
Properties of the tf-idf measure are discussed below (see Property 1).
Definition 4 (Closure System). Let S be a list of sessions on the set X of websites. We call closure system and we denote by S c the closure under intersection of S to which we add the set X .
X is a closure operator on X if for all sets A and B in X we
Theorem 1. Let S c be a closure system on a set X . Then the map C S c defined on 2
a closure operator on X .
Definition 6 (Closed Pattern). Let S
c be a closure system on a set X and C S c its corresponding closure operator. Let P ⊆ X be a pattern (i.e. a set of visited sites), we say that P is a closed pattern if
This definition is equivalent to the definition of a formal concept of the formal context K = (S, X , I) where S (the sessions) is the set of objects, X (the websites) the set of attributes and I a binary relation between S and X . If s ∈ S and x ∈ X , (s, x) ∈ I is read ''session s contains the web site x''. For a framework about formal contexts as a representation of closure systems, see [5] .
In Fig. 2 we give a graphic representation of the lattice of closed patterns from Marion's set of sessions. The lattice of closed patterns from Simon's set of sessions is given in the Appendix (see. Fig. A.10 ).
Property 1. Let P be a pattern and S u i be the list of sessions of a given user u i . We have:
(P) |≤ |U P | and straightforward from the definition, the tf-idf measure is maximized by the closed patterns. Remark. Unlike the support measure, the tf-idf does not admit a monotonic behavior with inclusion set operator. Indeed, from the running example, one can check that tf × idf Mar (a) = 3.log(2/2) = 0, tf × idf Mar (ae) = 3.log(2/1) = 3 and that tf × idf Mar (aef ) = 2.log(2/1) = 2.
Models for a learning closed-sets based classifier
The approach we have chosen to implement our classifier is based on three points:
1. Closed patterns selection: From a data set of web browsing logs we compute a set of closed patterns for each user. We call those patterns own patterns for a particular user. The measure used to select the patterns and the size of these patterns may vary. See Definition 7 and Fig. 3 for a graphic representation.
User profiles computation:
We compose a vector space that is common to all users from the closed patterns. Then we compute a vector profile for each user. All users are embedded in a common space with a similarity function. 3. Identification step: Thanks to the profiles computed in step 2, we are able to provide an identification for anonymous sessions by searching the nearest neighbor in the vector space. We then compute confusion matrices and we provide accuracy of the models.
In the remainder of this section, we will develop each of the aforementioned steps.
Own patterns selection
Definition 7 (Own Patterns). Let H cond be a heuristic that selects closed patterns under condition cond for a given user u i . Then the set of patterns selected by H cond for u i is called the set of own patterns of u i and denoted P u i .
The first and most important step of our model, called own patterns selection is to calculate the set of own patterns for each user u i . This set of patterns is denoted Fig. 3 ). Our experimental results show that the value of p should belong to the interval [100-140] to obtain the best performance. In [26] , each class is described by a set of 1-pattern with the best support or the best relative support. We call these approaches H sup and H relSupport . The aim of our study is to show that it could be more efficient to select closed k-patterns. But, the number of closed patterns should be strong, [28] provided by the Coron platform [24] .
The main principles of the different heuristics are summarized below: is a simplified process based on the tf-idf measure to select the closed own patterns (cf. Algorithm 1). As H sup , the Process H c sup uses the support measure to select the closed patterns. We will be able to compare their performance to show that closed patterns are more representative of a behavior. As previous processes, H c supMin (cf. Algorithm 2) use the support measure to select the closed patterns but only retain patterns which are minimal by inclusion set operator. This way, no pattern could be included in another one. Comparative performance of the heuristics is given in 
Example 3 (From Our Running Example). The value of p is fixed at 4 (instead of 10 in the experimental protocol). We give Marion's own patterns for the four approaches. Marion's closed patterns can be found in Fig. 2 
User profiles computation
We define and we denote P all = ⋃ i P u i the set of all own patterns for all users. The set P all allows us to define a common space in which all users could be embedded. More formally, P all defines a vector space V of size all = |P all | where a given user u i is represented as a vector Fig. 4 ). In the following we will refer to V u i as the profile vector of the user u i . 
Note that even if the choice of this measure can be seen as a parameter of the model, experimental results confirm that best accuracies are obtained when the measure is the same as that used to select own patterns. The size of the vector space V is equal to 10. We give in Fig. 5 profile vectors of Marion and Simon computed with the support measure.
Identification step
Identification step is to guess the user corresponding to an anonymous set of sessions. Note that all the sessions of a given anonymous set are naturally coming from a same user. Then, for each anonymous set of sessions we have to build a test profile and to find the nearest user profile defined during the learning step.
Test sessions
Performance of our models is calculated on anonymous sets of sessions of growing size, specifically from 1 session to 35 sessions. The more sessions we have in an anonymous set, the better the classification will be.
Building test profile
Let S be the set of all sessions from the data test set. Let S ut be an anonymous set of sessions from user u t , and the Euclidean distance and the cosine similarity between two vectors V u i and V ut respectively, where:
Note: Formally an Euclidean distance function has to be used in a linear independent space. Even if the vector space V is not exactly linearly independent, the results of our experimental tests look interesting (cf. Fig. 8 ).
We propose to test performance of two other similarity functions: the Kulczynski measure introduced in 1927 and the Dice similarity introduced independently by L.R Dice in 1945 and T. Sorensen in 1948. Both measures are statistical tools used to compare two vectors in R n .
Comparative performance of the two latter similarity functions is given in Fig. 8 .
Bayesian models
By keeping the formal framework described in the previous section we call S = ⋃ i S u i the whole set of sessions of the database, S u i being the list of sessions of a given user u i . By this way, a set of n users defines a class partition of the learning database. A Bayesian classifier states that a given anonymous session of size l, S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s l } (each s i is a web site in our context), is assigned to a user i if and only if for all j in [1, n] , i ̸ = j we have P(u i |S) > P(u j |S).
From the Bayes's theorem :
Traditional Bayes classifier
In practice, there is interest only in the term P(S|u i ) of that fraction. Under the independence assumptions, the conditional distribution over the class variable is:
is calculated from the learning database. A visited web site s k is not a continuous value then we can define P(s k |u i ) as the number of sessions of u i containing the visited web site s k divided by the total number of u i 's sessions.
The smoothed Bayes classifier
The major drawback with the traditional Bayes classifier is that a descriptor s k of an anonymous session, which never occurs in the learning data set of a given class, will produce a probability equal to zero. To avoid this problem, we have applied the Laplace smoothing, also called add-one smoothing, which consists of adding one to the support of each descriptor appearing in the learning data set of the given class. This way, the missing descriptor will have a support of 1/m (m being the number of sessions) and all other descriptors will see their support incremented by one. Thus, the frequency-based probability estimate will never be zero. When referring with the Bayes classifier, we are discussing the classifier on which we have applied the Laplace smoothing. 
Experimental results
Our data comes from Blaise Pascal University proxy servers. It consists of 17 × 10 6 lines of connection logs from more than 3,000 users and contains the user ID, the timestamp and a domain name for each line. We applied two types of filters on the domain names: blacklist filters and HTTP-request based filters. We used some lists 3 of domain names to remove all domains regarded as advertising. We also filtered the data by the status code obtained after a simple HTTP request on the domain name. After those steps, we still have 4.10 6 lines. We divide the file between the 3000 users to obtain the class files. The studies were conducted on the 150 users with the highest number of requests. Table 2 gives the detailed statistics for this data set. 4 
Experimental protocol: a description
Algorithm 3 describes our experimental protocol. The first loop on line 2 sets the size of the anonymous set of sessions to be classified to each attempt. For example, if S = 1, the classifier has to find the user behind one anonymous session, if S = 10, the classifier has to find the corresponding user of a set of 10 sessions. It is more difficult when the size of S is smaller. The loop on line 8 computes the specific patterns of each user and establishes the profiles vector. The loop on line 11 computes the vector's components for each user. The nested loops on lines 14 and 15 classify test data and compute the accuracy rate. Take S sessions from We have followed the protocol described above by executing our three heuristics on our dataset of 150 users (cf. Table 2 ) with anonymous sets of sessions of growing size, from one sessions to 35 sessions. The number of own patterns per user is fixed to 140 and their maximal size to 7. Each result is smoothed to 10 executions. Fig. 6 shows comparative performance of the heuristics and our naive Bayes classifier.
We are able to present four significant results. Firstly, for the three heuristics other than the Bayes classifier, models reach an accuracy close to 100% if the size of the anonymous set of sessions is beyond 25. Secondly, Heuristic H c tf −idf and our Bayes classifier are able to recognize one user among 150 with only one session (10 visited websites) with an accuracy close to 35%. The accuracy reaches 50% (resp. 60%) with an anonymous set of 3 sessions for H c tf −idf (resp. for the Bayes model). Thirdly, performance of Heuristic H c sup is significantly lower than the others. Finally, when the number of sessions in the anonymous set is around 15, the Bayes classifier reaches a plateau, and the different heuristics except H c sup have an accuracy of 90%.
Comparative performance with H sup and H relSupport
In [26] , the author compares, in particular, two methods called H sup and H relSupport to select own 1-patterns. H sup (resp. H relSupport ) selects the patterns with the best support (resp. the best relative support) and uses it as the numerical value for each component of the profile vector. In both cases, the own patterns are of size 1. In order to compare performance of the H c sup and H c tf −idf models with H sup and H relSupport we have accurately replicated the experimental protocol given in [26] on our own data set. The results are given in Table 3 and Fig. 7 for a zoom.
In Table 3 we compare three classes of methods: the smoothed Bayes classifier as a statistical approach, H Sup or H c sup which rely on the support measure to obtain a formal description of each user, and H relSupport or H c tf −idf which rely on the relative support or the tf-idf as a relative measure. From the relative support or the tf-idf our classifier is able to compute a description of each user, which sets it apart from others. From Table 3 we would like to highlight several key points. Firstly, with 2, 50, 100 or 150 users, the results of the classifier are not so far from each other for a given classifier. We conclude that it is possible to identify one user among a large amount of users by learning its visited websites. Secondly, regardless of the method, from an anonymous set of 10 sessions or more (in other words beyond 100 visited websites), the accuracy of the classifier is beyond 80%, even with 150 users.
The challenge is then to identify a user from the smallest possible number of sessions. In the case we have only one session to identify the given user, the Bayes method and H 
Distribution of own patterns according to size
From the own patterns of each user we compute the set P all as the set of all own patterns used to define the profile vector. In order to understand the impact of the chosen heuristic on the selected own patterns, Table 4 provides the distribution of P all according to size.
As we can observe in Table 4 , the distribution may vary considerably depending on the method used. Finally, Heuristic H c supMin , which selects closed own patterns which are minimal by inclusion set operator, produces an unbalanced distribution with 87.6% of own patterns of size one and 9.5% of size two. All these results are obtained with a number of own patterns per user equal to 140. If this number falls to 50 the distribution makes a shift to patterns of lower size (see Table 5 ).
Comparative performance of distance or similarity functions
We show in Figs. 8 and 9 the effect of the similarity function on model accuracy rate. Cosine and Dice similarity measures have same accuracy rate and rate of the Euclidean distance are always lower than the others.
Analysis and conclusion
In this study, we addressed the issue of authenticating a user based on its behavior in a system. In our experimental context, a behavior would consist of a list of websites visited by each user, but the model could be extended to a set of functions to be executed on a given system. For this purpose we have compiled a large dataset of 17.10 6 connection logs for 3,000 users. This dataset has been cleaned and filtered, and we have designed a set of 68,481 sessions for 150 users. To identify each user from the others we have introduced a closed set-based learning classifier which can be described as a combination of the binary classifier studied in [14] and classifiers based on emerging patterns described in [6, 19] . To select the best patterns from the huge amount of closed patterns extracted from the dataset of each user, we compared several approaches based on the support, the relative support, and the tf-idf measures. To complete the study, we have designed a smoothed Bayes classifier and we compared the set of models by reproducing the experimental protocol described in [26] on our own dataset. As explained in the introduction, the challenge is for example to detect identity theft on a system used by numerous users as quickly as possible. This way, there are two main parameters. The first lies in the number of users of the system and the second lies in the number of sessions 5 available to the classifier to identify one user amongst the others. The lower the number of sessions, the more difficult the problem is. Our experimental results show that even with 150 users all heuristics have an accuracy rate beyond 80% if the anonymous set contains 10 or more sessions (see Table 3 ). Specifically, in that case Heuristic H c tf −idf is the most efficient and reaches 100% with 20 sessions or more. If the anonymous set of sessions contains between one and ten sessions, heuristics based on relative measures such as the relative support, and the tf-idf have much better accuracy rate than the support measure. In particular, Heuristic H relSupport has an accuracy rate of 40% to identify one user among 150 with only one session. The smoothed Bayes classifier has very good accuracy rate even with small anonymous set of sessions but reaches a plateau with an accuracy of 85% for around 15 sessions in the anonymous set (see Fig. 6 ).
We recall that the design of our models depends on some others parameters such as the number of own patterns for each user, the maximal size of these own patterns, the size of a session and the distance/similarity function.
All these parameters can be set with our classifier.
Number of own patterns for each user. In the present study, we have shown two major effects of increasing the number of own patterns to describe each user. Firstly, if this number is smaller than 50 and if the anonymous set of sessions contains only one session, then a significative number of these sessions cannot be classified. Indeed, to classify a session (correctly or not) the classifier needs to find at least one match between the profile vector (seen as a list of patterns), and this anonymous session (see Fig. D .13 in the Appendix). Otherwise the vector is null. Secondly, as seen in Tables 4 and 5 the distribution of own patterns according to size depends on their number. The lesser the number of own patterns, the higher the proportion of small size own patterns is.
Maximum size of own patterns. We have shown that we were able to identify a user among 150 by extracting patterns of size one with H relSupport or H c tf −idf . However, an intuitive idea could be that with own patterns of different sizes (between 1 and 7 for example) heuristics could extract some very specific own patterns for each users and this way should be more efficient. It is partially true. Specifically, when the anonymous set of sessions is beyond 10 sessions H c tf −idf reaches an accuracy rate 5 In our study a session contains 10 unique visited websites. of 80% (see Fig. 6 ) with patterns of different sizes (see Table 4 ) and is better than H relSupport with own patterns of size one. However, with few sessions in the anonymous set, we can see in Fig. E. 14 that increasing the maximum size slightly reduces the accuracy. The possibility to choose the size of our patterns can give some elements of semantic analysis, a feature that is desired in a fair number of applications in the industry, such as profiling for users or behaviors.
Size of a session. As mentioned in [26] and other studies, we obtained the best accuracy rate with sessions of 10 visited websites. There is no doubt that the size of a session needs to be calibrated to the potential size of the own patterns to be extracted. Indeed, the building-session process arbitrary cuts the log after each 10 unique websites and this way may lose and spread some valuable patterns across two different sessions.
Similarity and distance functions. Finally, we compared performance of different similarity functions and showed that for our study, Cosine and Duce similarity presents the best accuracy rate for all heuristics (see Fig. 9 ). The Euclidean distance has average rate for Heuristic H supMin and significantly worse accuracy rate for H c tf −idf (see Fig. 8 ).
In the near term, our intention is to supplement the model by studying some other own patterns selection criteria. Here, we can cite the stability measure introduced in [11] and evaluated in [2, 15] . In particular, in a recent paper [16] , Kuznetsov and Makhalova compare interestingness measures of closed patterns including stability, some probabilistic estimates of stability and robustness. It would be interesting to compare the accuracy rate obtained by some heuristics based on these measures with the accuracy rate obtained in the present study.
From a longer-term perspective, our goal is to extract some ordered patterns. Indeed, in the present study, a session has been interpreted as a set of visited sites and extracted own patterns are non ordered closed-patterns. It seems intuitive that the order relation of visited websites should provide more information to guess the user of a given anonymous set of sessions. An ordered session is called a sequence in the literature and several efficient algorithms have been designed specifically for their extraction (see Algorithms GSP in [22] and Spade in [27] ). However, the number of sequences which can be extracted from a given context is very large and, as for the present study, some heuristics will have to be designed to select the more relevant patterns. 
Appendix D. Number of own patterns per user
The number of own patterns to be selected for describing each user is an important parameter of our study. As an example, we have shown with Tables 4 and 5 that this parameter had an effect on the size of the selected patterns. In the following diagram given in Fig. D.13 we give the rate of anonymous set of sessions which they were able to be classified by the classifier. However, the problem especially occurs with anonymous sets of only one or two sessions. As an example, with one session and less than 20 own patterns, the model classifies less than 60% of the anonymous set of sessions. On the contrary, with more than 50 own patterns per user, the model classifies 100% of the anonymous sets of three sessions or more.
Appendix E. Maximal size of own patterns
See Fig. E. 14. 
